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I
INTRODUCTION
It is common for trends to emerge in the approach which a country's
judiciary takes to a particular field of law, and for that approach to evolve
gradually over time. Different judicial eras can often be delineated, at times
reflecting changes in the membership of a nation's highest court. In the
equality rights field, the pattern which emerges in Canada is best
characterized as a fast-moving, accelerating roller coaster ride.
At times, Canada's courts, led by the Supreme Court, have reached
unprecedented heights in the effective recognition of the nature of inequality
and discrimination, and the sensitive and forceful implementation of legal
doctrine to ensure its effective eradication. At other points, Canadian courts
have manifested an unduly narrow, restrictively technical and strikingly
insensitive response to equality rights. These diverging and contradictory
approaches have become virtually contemporaneous in the past few years.
They leave equality-seekers in Canada, those disadvantaged by virtue of race,
sex, disability, age, and other similar causes, confused about the scope of their
legal protection, uncertain about the extent to which Canada's courts will
protect them from unlawful and unconstitutional discrimination, and
ambivalent about the capacity of law and justice systems to promote equality.
This article's purpose is to survey the path which the Canadian judiciary
has taken on the road to equality. It seeks to answer the question whether and
to what extent Canada's courts have employed Canadian law to combat
discrimination effectively and to achieve equality for the disadvantaged in
society. This path is surveyed by examining a series of periods, which have
been typified by ups and downs, and by twists and turns, akin to a roller
coaster ride. The eras are surveyed in sequence, leading up to the great
breakthroughs in the 1980s and the most recent, sharp plunge downward in
1990.
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THE EARLIEST YEARS-A RAPID DOWNWARD PLUNGE
For the vast preponderance of Canadian history, the protection of equality
rights was situated close to the bottom of the judicial priority list. Over the
first ninety years of Canada's history, courts generally did not infuse
egalitarian values or protection into either Canadian constitutional or
common law. This was so despite the potential availability of these legal tools
to redress, at least to a limited extent, problems of discrimination.
Even though Canada's Constitution lacked an explicit bill of rights prior to
1982, the Supreme Court endeavored for a time to recognize in it an "implied
bill of rights," replete with limited protections for freedom of expression,
press, religion, and assembly.' However, no judicial effort was undertaken to
infuse equality guarantees for the disadvantaged and disenfranchised into this
implied bill of rights. 2 Indeed, efforts to attack the constitutionality of overtly
racist legislative workplace restrictions, even based on federalism doctrines,
tended typically to meet with failure in this century's earliest years. 3
The common law in Canada, as in England, has often shown itself capable
of evolving over time to create new doctrines which meaningfully respond to
changes in society and social values. However, it demonstrated itself to be
ineffectual in this regard insofar as protecting against discrimination. Efforts
to invoke common law contract, tort, and property principles to attack racially
discriminatory business practices met with failure,4 with one exception. In the
1940s, an Ontario court invalidated a racially-based restrictive covenant on
land. Even then, this result was achieved only on grounds of vagueness, and
not on account of any judicial recognition of a public policy against
discrimination. 5 Indeed, in the current era of statutorily protecting against
discriminatory practices, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that such
protections are entirely a creature of statute, and that equality-seekers can
secure no assistance from the common law. 6
With the judicial evolution of administrative law constraints on the
exercise of governmental power at common law over this century, it was open
to Canadian courts to fashion protections for equality rights, much as they
crafted protections against deprivations of property or contractual rights.
Yet, this generally did not happen. To the extent that an extremely limited
1. See Reference reAlberta Statutes, [1938] SCR 100, aff'd, [1939] AC 117; Saumur v Quebec, [1953]
2 SCR 299; Switzman v Elbling, [1957] SCR 285.
2. See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 635-38 (Carswell, 1985). There are no cases
in which the Supreme Court considered infusing an equality rights guarantee into the implied bill of
rights.
3. Cunningham and British Columbia (Attorney General) v Tomey Homma and Canada (Attorney General),
[1903] AC 111 (PC); see also Irwin Cotler, Freedom of Assembly, Association, Conscience and Religion, in
Gerald A. Beaudoin & Ed Ratushny, eds, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 165-91 (Carswell,
2d ed 1989).
4. See Loew"s Montreal Theaters Ltd. v Reynolds, 30 Que KB 459 (1919); Franklin v Evans, 55 OLR
349 (1924); Rogers v Clarence Hotel, [1940] 2 WWR 152.
5. Re Drummond Wren, [1945] OR 778.
6. See Seneca College v Bhadauria, [1981] 2 SCR 181, 188.
Page 167: Winter 1992]
common law rule against the enactment of discriminatory municipal bylaws
has been judicially enunciated, this doctrine has served only to protect
businesses against seemingly arbitrary or irrational regulation of their hours
or venue of business. 7
As a result of mounting legislative recognition of the destructiveness of the
most virulent manifestations of discrimination in society around the time of
World War II, provincial legislatures slowly began to enact piecemeal
legislation prohibiting certain forms of racial and religious discrimination.
These legislative initiatives proliferated in the 1950s, making certain denials
of equality offenses punishable by prosecution in court.8 However, they were
considered largely ineffectual at redressing social inequalities. 9
A core defect with these laws was that their enforcement was left to the
courts. One had to present discrimination claims by way of individual
prosecutions. Canada's criminal justice system generally did not provide a
receptive haven for those seeking redress from discriminatory practices.10
III
FROM 1960 TO 1981-THE FIRST ASCENT AND THE DOWNWARD RUNS
Perhaps the greatest stride forward on the Canadian road to equality
occurred between 1960 and 1981, when provincial legislatures, followed by
the federal Parliament, decided to take the job of protecting minorities from
discrimination predominantly out of the hands of the judiciary and to assign it
to new, specialized administrative agencies. These human rights commissions
and boards were charged with responsibility for investigation, mediation, and
adjudication of discrimination claims in economic fields such as access to jobs,
housing, goods, and services."' The agencies and administrative tribunals
were gradually armed with progressively-expanded legislative mandates to
address newly recognized problems of discrimination based on such grounds
as gender, age, marital status, and, more recently, disability, receipt of social
assistance, and sexual orientation.' 2
7. See City of Montreal v Arcade Amusements, [1985] 1 SCR 368; Re Bunce and Town of Cobourg,
[1963] 2 OR 343.
8. See, for example, Racial Discrimination Act, SO 1944, ch 51; Saskatchewan Bill of Rights
Act, SS 1947, ch 35; The Fair Employment Practices Act, SO 1951, ch 24; The Fair Accommodation
Practices Act, SS 1956, ch 68.
9. Walter S. Tarnopolsky & William F. Pentney, Discrimination and the Law 2-3 through 2-6
(Richard De Boo, 1985).
10. Id at 2-1 through 2-14; see also Cameron v Nel-Gor Castle Nursing Home, 5 CHRR D/2170 (Ont
Bd of Inquiry, 1984).
11. Tarnopolsky & Pentney, Discrimination and the Law at 2-1 through 2-14 (cited in note 9).
12. The original Human Rights Code was passed in Ontario in 1961-62. Ontario Code of
Human Rights, SO 1961-62, ch 93. Thereafter, each province passed similar legislation and
thereafter amended it repeatedly. Current statutes are: Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, ch
H-6; British Columbia Human Rights Act, SBC 1984, ch 22: Alberta Individual Rights Protection
Act, RSA 1980, ch 1-2 (as amended); Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, ch 5-241 (as
amended); Manitoba Human Rights Code, CSM, ch H 175; Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms, RSQ 1977, ch C-12 (as amended); New Brunswick Human Rights Code, RSNB 1973, ch
H-Il (as amended); Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, SNS 1969, ch I I (as amended); Prince Edward
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Human Rights Commission staff and the jurists impanelled as adjudicators
on the tribunals which decide discrimination cases developed extensive
expertise in identifying subtle and overt discrimination, and in fashioning
effective remedies to correct it. A burgeoning, voluminous human rights
jurisprudence has evolved. It elucidates an indigenous set of substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary doctrines sensitively tailored to achieve the
important goals of human rights legislation. 13
This transfer of the vast preponderance of anti-discrimination work from
courts to administrative agencies met with success.14 These agencies grew in
size as their case loads proliferated and as their task's subtle complexity
became more manifest. Yet, over the 1960s and 1970s, some responsibility
for the enforcement of equality rights was still reposed in Canada's judiciary,
emanating from two legal sources. In each of these, the judicial performance
in charting an expeditious path down the road to equality was not
substantially better than it had been in the first half of this century. Indeed, it
rather resembled a roller coaster's sharp downward plunge.
The first residual source for judicial responsibility over equality rights was
the statutory Canadian Bill of Rights, 15 a federal law enacted in 1960 to
guarantee fundamental civil liberties against abridgement by the federal
government. The Bill guarantees in section 1(b) the right to equality before
the law and the protection of the law, and ensures in the opening words of the
section that this right, along with the others listed in section 1, exists without
discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion, or sex. 16
The Bill of Rights expressly prevails over all federal legislation, except for
those statutes which explicitly exempt themselves from its reach.' 7 Courts are
under an explicit statutory duty to construe and apply federal laws in a fashion
which ensures the protection of the rights and freedoms enumerated in the
Bill. 18
Though not exactly constitutional in scope, the Bill's lofty guarantees,
expressed in sweeping and absolutist language, provided Canada's courts
with a new, ample mandate to enforce such important rights as freedom from
discrimination at the hands of the national government. Despite an initial
signal from the Supreme Court that the Bill's equality guarantee was to be
taken seriously, 19 Canada's highest court proceeded to enunciate a series of
doctrines which ensured its consummate failure. Taken together, these
holdings decimated the Bill's equality guarantee in a fashion which seemed to
reflect the prevailing judicial approach in the equality field in this century,
Island Human Rights Act, SPEI 1975, ch 72 (as amended); Newfoundland Human Rights Code,
1988, SNfld 1988, ch 62; Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981, SO 1981, ch 53 (as amended).
13. This jurisprudence can be found in the Canadian Human Rights Reporter series.
14. Tarnopolsky & Pentney, Discrimination and the Law at chs 14, 15 (cited in note 9). See
generally Judith Keene, Human Rights in Ontario (Carswell, 1983).
15. RSC 1970, App III at 457-60.
16. Idat § 1.
17. Idat §2.
18. Id.
19. See R. v Drybones, [1970] SCR 282.
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rather than reflecting any serious effort to ascertain and implement the
legislative intent underlying the Canadian Bill of Rights.
The Supreme Court in effect held that courts should be exceedingly
deferential to the will of Parliament in assessing the compatibility of federal
laws with the Bill, even though it was Parliament itself which had commanded
the courts to enforce the Bill's guarantees. 20 The Court held that while
section l(b) of the Bill guaranteed a right to equality, this right was not
egalitarian in nature.2' It held that equality rights were inapplicable to laws
extending benefits to the public, 22 and that any differential treatment
mandated under federal law was unassailable so long as it was relatable to a
legislative purpose which falls within the constitutional jurisdiction of the
federal government-a test which all constitutionally valid federal laws
necessarily can pass.23
The second residual source ofjudicial authority concerning equality rights
during this period was the courts' power to supervise provincial human rights
agencies and tribunals through administrative law doctrines and, in some
instances, through statutory appellate jurisdiction. Though less obvious here
than in the Canadian Bill of Rights context, judicial performance in this field
did not reflect any greater vigour in the enforcement of equality rights, at
least insofar as the Supreme Court of Canada was concerned. At this time,
the Supreme Court was clearly not in the forefront of the effort to ensure
forceful implementation of the legislative commitment to equality set forth in
human rights statutes.
There is very little in the way of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the
Human Rights Code context before 1980. The most extensive treatment
involved an extremely restrictive approach to such legislation. In Gay Alliance
Towards Equality v. Vancouver Sun, 24 the Supreme Court rejected a complaint of
discrimination with respect to services offered to the public brought by a
homosexual group against a daily newspaper. The paper had refused to run
the organization's advertisement on sexual orientation grounds.
Because the human rights statute in question had an open-ended equality
guarantee, the case raised the question whether discrimination because of
sexual orientation was prohibited by the statute. The majority ducked this
question. It decided the case instead on the ground that a statutory guarantee
against discrimination with respect to services customarily available to the
public simply did not apply to advertising space in a newspaper, even though
newspapers routinely offer such space for sale to the public.
20. See, for example, Curr v the Queen, [1972] SCR 889 (per Laskin); Canada (Attorney General) v
Lavell, [1974] SCR 1349.
21. See Lavell, [1974] SCR at 1365 (per Ritchie).
22. Bliss v Canada (Attorney General), [1979] 1 SCR 183, 192-94.
23. Id. An apparent retreat from this extremely minimal standard of review was suggested in
the concurring opinion of Justice McIntyre in MacKay v the Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 370, 407, although
the Charter's advent eclipsed this late jurisprudential development. In subsequent Charter cases, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Canadian Bill of Rights had generally received a very narrow
judicial interpretation. See, for example, Singh v ME., [1985] 1 SCR 177 (Wilson concurring).
24. [1979] 2 SCR 435.
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In construing "services" extremely narrowly to apply essentially to
restaurants, hotels, and the like, the majority ironically invoked freedom of
speech as a partial support for its decision. This was impossible to square
with the Canadian approach to free speech at that time. There was then no
explicit constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech in effect in Canada.
The limited free speech guarantee in the "implied bill of rights"
jurisprudence was by then judicially discarded. 25 The Canadian Bill of Rights,
which the majority actually cited, did not apply to the provincial statute in
issue in that case. In short, the Supreme Court's most detailed
pronouncement on human rights before the 1980s was insensitive to the value
of equality and its fundamental importance in a democracy. It was
purportedly justified by an invocation of free speech at a time when such
invocation had no legal foundation.
IV
THE 1980s-THE SUPREME COURT'S SHARP ASCENTS TOWARDS
EQUALITY AND THE LOWER COURTS' DESCENTS
This long-term trend against active judicial enforcement of equality rights
took an extraordinarily sharp turn at the start the 1980s, primarily at the
direction of the Supreme Court of Canada. The 1980s was a decade of
unprecedented Supreme Court activity targeted at providing vigorous
equality rights protection, both in the statutory and constitutional contexts. It
reflected a new and profound judicial commitment to the ideal of equality,
and to the implementation of legislative mandates to see this ideal
aggressively promoted.
The Supreme Court's accomplishments during this decade in the human
rights field speak for themselves as a drastic break from the judicial past.
Whereas the statutory Canadian Bill of Rights was relegated to virtual legal
oblivion on account of concerns about parliamentary sovereignty, the
Supreme Court ruled that human rights statutes are essentially quasi-
constitutional in character. 26 The egalitarian commands of these statutes take
firm precedence over all other legislation, except where a contrary legislative
intent is clearly manifested. Human rights statutes must receive a large and
liberal interpretation to root out the social blight of discrimination
effectively. 27 Any statutory exceptions to human rights guarantees must be
construed narrowly, to the same end.2 8
Lower court rulings had strictly confined human rights protection to clear
cases of overtly intentional or purposive discrimination, despite a broader
approach to equality having emanated from human rights boards of inquiry. 29
25. Canada (Attorney General) v Dupond, [1978] 2 SCR 770.
26. Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears, Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 547.
27. Id at 546-47; see also Ontario Human Rights Commission v Etobicoke, [1982] 1 SCR 202.
28. See, for example, Etobicoke, [1982] 1 SCR at 212.
29. Compare, for example, Simpsons-Sears, 36 OR (2d) 59 (Div Ct 1982), aff'd, 38 OR (2d) 423
(CA 1982), with O'Malley v Simpsons-Sears, Ltd., 2 CHRR D/267 (Ont Bd Inquiry 1981).
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In powerful contrast, the Supreme Court ruled that the concept of equality in
such legislation goes much further. It prohibits both intentional and
unintentional discrimination, the latter also being called constructive or
"adverse effects" discrimination. 30
According to the Supreme Court, legislative injunctions against
discrimination impose an affirmative duty to accommodate the special needs
of racial, religious, and other minorities, where their full and equal
participation in employment and other like economic opportunities is
impeded by neutral requirements with discriminatory effects, and where
accommodation would not impose undue hardship on the party imposing the
unintentionally discriminatory barrier.3' Obscure and abstruse statutory
interpretation concerns initially led the Court, in the mid 1980s, to restrict
this liberal approach to constructive discrimination to only some of Canada's
human rights statutes. 32 However, a later decision removed these technical
impediments and infused the duty to accommodate into all such legislation,
with a high standard of justification demanded of defendants who claim that
accommodation cannot be achieved short of undue hardship.33
Augmenting these important advances were critical Supreme Court sex
equality decisions during this decade. The Court held that discrimination
because of pregnancy is, in substance, sex discrimination. 34 This effectively
overruled a previous, highly formalistic, and widely criticized ruling in 1979
under the Canadian Bill of Rights to the effect that pregnancy-based
discrimination denies equality to pregnant people, though not on account of
their gender.3 5 The Court also ruled that sexual harassment in the workplace
constitutes sex discrimination, thereby extending the right to equality beyond
the simple formalization of the work relationship to the substance of the
entire work environment. 36 Finally, the Court affirmed the broad mandate of
human rights tribunals to shape sweeping remedies to rectify systemic
discrimination by upholding a tribunal's imposition of substantial affirmative
action or employment equity remedies on an employer with a bad track record
of systemic sex inequality. 37 These gender equality decisions at times
involved the Supreme Court intervening to re-institute the liberal approach to
equality rights protection created by a human rights tribunal but overturned
by a lower court.38
In tandem with this decade's important human rights developments was
the Supreme Court's initial enunciation of general principles for the
interpretation of Canada's new constitutional Charter of Rights and
30. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR at 547-50.
31. Id at 552-56.
32. Compare id with Bhinder v Canadian Nall Railway, [1985] 2 SCR 561.
33. Alberta Human Rights Commission v Central Alberta Dairy Pool, [1990] 2 SCR 489.
34. Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 SCR 1219.
35. Bliss v Canada (Attorney General), [1979] 1 SCR 183.
36. Robichaud v Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 SCR 84, 92.
37. Canadian Nall Railway v Canada Human Rights Commission, [1987] 1 SCR 1114.
38. Canadian Natl Railway v Canada Human Rights Commission, [1985] 1 FC 96; Brennan v The Queen,
[1984] 2 FC 798.
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Freedoms, enacted in 1982 as part of Canada's supreme law.39 The Charter
includes a broadly worded guarantee in section 15(1) of equality "before and
under the law" and the "equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability."'40 This provision includes an exception in section 15(2) to
preserve the constitutionality of affirmative action programs, that is, laws,
programs, and activities whose objective is the amelioration of the conditions
of disadvantaged persons or groups, including those disadvantaged because
of their race, religion, or other characteristics enumerated in section 15(l).41
Charter section 1 also preserves as constitutional any "reasonable limits" on
Charter rights which are "prescribed by law" and which "can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." 42
For the most part, lower courts initially took a firm "wait and see" attitude
towards the Charter. They often construed it quite narrowly, akin to the
statutory Canadian Bill of Rights, until the Supreme Court directed
otherwise.43 In its earliest Charter pronouncements, the Supreme Court
forcefully indicated that the Charter must be taken seriously, as a substantial
departure from the Canadian Bill of Rights experience. 44 The Court held that
Charter rights must be construed liberally and purposively, 45 and that limits
on these rights, imposed under section l's reasonable limits clause, shall be
held to a strict justificatory standard. 46 Pursuant to the section 1 test specified
in the case of Regina v. Oakes,47 governmental limits on civil liberties are
constitutionally sustainable only if they are clearly prescribed by a law that is
39. Can Const (Constitution Act, 1982) pt I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
40. Section 15(1) of the Charter provides as follows:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.
41. Section 15(2) of the Charter provides as follows:
Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.
42. Section I of the Charter provides as follows:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.
43. See, for example, Re Regina and Potma, 37 OR (2d) 189 (HCJ 1982); R. v Morgentaler, 12 DLR
(4th) 502 (Ont SC 1984), appeal quashed, 14 DLR (4th) 184 (Ont CA 1984); R. v Banville, 145 DLR
(3d) 595 (NBQB 1983), varying 141 DLR (3d) 36 (NB Prov Ct 1982); Re Global Communications and
Canada (Attorney General), 44 OR (2d) 609 (CA 1984); Re Cromer and BC Teachers' Federation, 5 WWR
638 (BCA 1986).
44. Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357; Hunter v Southam Inc., [1984] 2 SCR
145; Singh v M.E.L, [1985] 1 SCR 177 (Wilson); R. v Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295.
45. Hunter, [1984] 2 SCR at 156.
46. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR at 295.
47. R. v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 105-06.
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not vague,48 if they are narrowly and carefully tailored to achieve pressing and
substantial societal goals which are of sufficient importance to warrant the
overriding of Charter rights, if they are trimmed to impair Charter rights as
little as possible, and if they are proportionate to their objectives.
Although the implementation date of the Charter's equality guarantee was
deferred for three years to 1985, 4 9 the Supreme Court's earliest pre-section
15 Charter rulings foreshadowed a strong commitment to constitutional
protection against discrimination. This paralleled the Court's new dedication
to the success of statutory human rights guarantees. The Court declared that
the Charter's rights must be liberally construed to achieve the Constitution's
goal of securing for Canada a free and democratic society, and underscored
that a core component of this goal is the fostering of equality and social
diversity. 50 Thus, equality, which had played so minimal a role in Canadian
law over most of our history, has been elevated to a pivotal ingredient of our
Constitution's very raison d'etre.
The Supreme Court also proclaimed in advance of section 15's coming
into force that equality, as a constitutional construct, is sweeping in scope. It
is not simply restricted to purposive or intentional governmental
discrimination. It includes protection against discriminatory effects of
legislation and other government action. This emanates from the Court's
ruling in a freedom of religion case that equality can well require different
treatment of individuals and groups. 51
With the Supreme Court's strong signals about equality's new primacy,
Charter section 15's 1985 advent could have been expected to yield
immediate and substantial new protections from lower courts in favour of
women, disabled persons, and other disadvantaged minorities. Yet this was
not to be. Before the Supreme Court first decided a Charter section 15 case,
lower courts quickly bogged down in the enunciation of abstruse and
ineffectual tests for defining Charter equality rights.
Some lower courts defined equality as requiring governments to treat
persons similarly situated in a similar fashion. 52 Others found discrimination
to exist wherever a law differentiated between two groups of persons,
however delineated, where the law's purpose was adjudged to be
unreasonably, irrationally, or unfairly connected to its means. 53 At times,
these tests were redefined each time they were applied. 54
48. The vagueness principle was first enunciated in Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society v
Ontario Board of Censors, 147 DLR (3d) 58 (Ont Div Ct 1983), and was later recognized by the Supreme
Court in Reference re Criminal Code (Man), [1990] 1 SCR 1123, 1150.
49. Charter § 32(2).
50. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR at 136.
51. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR at 347 (Dickson).
52. See, for example, R. v Century 21 Ramos Realty Inc. and Ramos, 58 OR (2d) 737 (CA 1987); R.
v Ertel, 35 CC (3d) 398 (Ont CA 1987).
53. See, for example, Wilson v British Columbia Medical Services Commission, 30 BCLR (2d) I (BCSC
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 53 DLR (4th) 171 (BCA 1988).
54. See id and the cases cited in note 52.
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By these various tests, the vast preponderance of lower court
constitutional equality litigation involved business challenges to regulatory
legislation impeding their unrestricted pursuit of profit, and criminal
accused's challenges advancing procedural due process concerns in the guise
of equality issues. 55 Equality cases quickly degenerated into litigation over
the wisdom of impugned laws, pure and simple, wholly unconnected to the
Canadian human rights tradition from which section 15 sprang. 56 This
jurisprudence roughly paralleled the United States' "rational basis" test for
minimal scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause,
with one critical difference. In the United States, minimal scrutiny is
overwhelmingly, though not entirely, associated with extreme judicial
deference for, at times, virtually unintelligible legislative distinctions. 57 In
Canada, "rationality review" translated into judicial "adhocracy," with
unpredictable, simultaneous bouts of judicial interventionism and judicial
restraint. 58
This earliest round of section 15 cases yielded little for women and the
other disadvantaged groups enumerated in section 15 for particular
protection from discrimination. For example, men often secured more than
women from sex equality. 59 One court solved the problem of provincial social
assistance available to women but not men by taking the welfare entitlement
away from women. 60 There, constitutional equality meant judicially-imposed
impoverishment for all. Similarly, disabled persons secured little optimism
from the lower courts' section 15 approach. Nineteenth-century criminal
legislation requiring the indefinite detention of criminal accuseds found unfit
to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity was upheld, whether or not
those incarcerated remained either mentally disordered or dangerous, and
regardless of the triviality of their offenses.6'
From the perspective of women, disabled persons, and other
disadvantaged groups seeking equality under the Charter, the lower courts'
approach to equality in this initial section 15 jurisprudence was to a degree a
throwback to the judicial treatment of equality prevailing in the earlier part of
this century. For them, a critical breakthrough occurred when the Supreme
Court first ruled on section 15 claims in the latter part of the 1980s. The
highest court enunciated several core section 15 doctrines in two decisions.
55. See id; Re Aluminum Co. of Canada and the Queen in right of Ontario, 29 DLR (4th) 583 (Ont Div
Ct 1986); Institute of Edible Oil Foods v Ontario, 47 DLR (4th) 368 (1987), aff'd on other grounds, 64
DLR (4th) 380 note (Ont CA 1988).
56. M. David Lepofsky & Schwartz Hart, An Erroneous Approach to the Charter's Equality Guarantee:
Regina v. Ertel, 67 Canadian Bar Rev 116, 126 (1988).
57. See Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 US 483 (1955); United States Railroad Retirement
Board v Fritz, 449 US 166 (1980).
58. See cases cited in note 55; see also R. v Hamilton, 30 CC (3d) 257 (Ont CA 1986) (Morden);
Hutton v Ontario (Attorney General) (Ont CA March 7, 1990) (unreported).
59. Shelagh Day & Gwen Brodsky, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Forward or
Two Steps Back (Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989).
60. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) et al. v Phillips, 34 DLR (4th) 633 (NSSC 1986); see also Reference
Re Family Benefits Act (NS) § 5, 75 NSR (2d) 338 (1986).
61. R. v Swain, 53 OR(2d) 609 (CA 1986).
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These decisions were Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews 62 (striking a
provincial statute categorically excluding non-citizens from the practice of law
in British Columbia) and Turpin v. the Queen63 (upholding a federal criminal
code section that allowed an individual charged with an indictable offence in
Alberta to be tried by judge alone.)
The Andrews/Turpin approach to equality ensures that section 15's
protection focuses squarely on those discrete and insular groups in society
who have been disadvantaged because of a personal attribute. As a matter of
general approach, the Supreme Court acknowledged that section 15 of the
Charter is tied closely to the evolution of human rights protection in Canada,
and that it aims to ensure equality of opportunity at the hands of government
to persons disadvantaged in society because of their race, sex, religion, or
other analogous personal characteristic. 64 Contrary to the approach taken in
many lower courts, the Charter's equality guarantee was held not to embroil
the Court in reviewing the merits of all legislative distinctions between
individuals or groups, and was not a mandate for the wholesale judicial review
of all statutes to test their rationality as such.65 The Supreme Court
categorically rejected the "similar treatment for persons similarly situated"
test, employed predominately in Ontario courts, as wholly unsuited to the task
of achieving section 15's objectives. 66
The Andrews/Turpin approach properly limits the grounds of
discrimination which are actionable under the Charter. Section 15's text
enumerates nine prohibited grounds of discrimination, and leaves it to courts
to add other "unenumerated" grounds to this non-exhaustive list. The
Supreme Court rejected any possibility that the list of actionable grounds of
discrimination is infinite or that all legislative distinctions are constitutionally
suspect under section 15. Instead, it held that the only grounds of
discrimination which are actionable beyond the enumerated grounds are
those which are "analogous" to them. 67
The Supreme Court provided some inkling of the analysis to be used for
deciding whether a proffered ground of discrimination, not found in section
15's text, is "analogous," although no attempt was made to be systematic or
exhaustive. Various justices considered whether a proposed ground of
discrimination pertains to a personal characteristic and whether it relates to a
discrete and insular minority which has suffered from stereotyping and
political or social disadvantage, independent of the particular impugned
law.68
62. [1989] 1 SCR 143.
63. [1989] 1 SCR 1296.
64. Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 170.
65. Id at 168 (McIntyre).
66. Id at 167-68; Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR at 1332 (Wilson). This approach had been used
predominantly in the Ontario Courts.
67. Andrews, [19891 1 SCR at 182; Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR at 1332; see also Reference re lWorkers"
Compensation Act, 1983 (Newfoundland), [ 1989] 1 SCR 922.
68. Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 183 (McIntyre); id at 152 (Wilson); see also Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR at
1330-33 (Wilson).
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To develop this analysis into a manageable test which lower courts can
systematically apply and governments can reasonably foresee, criteria for
determining whether a ground is "analogous" can be expanded. They can
include consideration of whether the ground has been recognized in existing
human rights statutes or other anti-discrimination laws, whether Canada is
under an international obligation to eliminate a certain genre of
discrimination, and generally, whether the ground is analogous in the sense
that it involves either an intimate, immutable physical attribute or a
fundamental personal choice, akin to one's religion, which is constitutionally
immunized from state intrusion.
The enumerated grounds in section 15 should not be treated as having
been included by accident or coincidence, as had been the case under the
"similarly situated" approach to equality. 69 Rather, they should serve as a
clear guidepost as to the kinds of discrimination at which section 15 was
targeted. A plaintiff, seeking a judicial expansion of section 15's grounds to
include a particular unenumerated ground, should be required to adduce
contcnporary or historical proof establishing the existence of the requisite
factors. Government studies documenting a minority's disadvantaged status
would be highly probative.
While this "analogous grounds" approach might be criticized for
confining section 15's actionable grounds, such criticism is unwarranted. By
so limiting the actionable grounds, the Supreme Court ensured that the full
force of section 15 could be targeted at protecting those disadvantaged
groups whom it was intended to serve, while leaving manageable breathing
room for legislative activity and for judicial recognition of additional groups
requiring equality rights protection, as experience accumulates. This tracks
closely the development of human rights legislation in Canada, whose
recognition of groups deserving protection from discrimination has evolved
gradually. The Andrews/Turpin approach also effectively roots out the plethora
of section 15 economic and business distinction and criminal due process
cases which had so preoccupied lower courts, and which had improperly
distracted from section 15's core task.
Contemporaneous with the focusing of section 15 on those groups truly
needing its protection was Andrews/Turpin's assurance that the content of
section 15's promise of equality to its beneficiaries is a generous one. Section
15 bans not only purposive discrimination, but unintentional or "adverse
effects" discrimination as well. 70 This makes section 15 far more potent than
the United States' equal protection clause, which is restricted to purposive
discrimination alone. 71 This difference reflects the Canadian Supreme
Court's recognition that systemic discrimination is in fact more pervasive than
intentional discrimination in Canadian society. 72
69. See note 55.
70. Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 173 (McIntyre).
71. Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976).
72. Canadian Human Rights Commission v Taylor el al., 75 DLR (4th) 577, 603 (SC 1990) (Dickson).
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The Andrews/Turpin approach also requires that any effort by government
to justify disadvantageous treatment based on an impermissible ground of
discrimination must be defended under Charter section l's reasonable limits
clause, and not under section 15. The Supreme Court effectively discarded
various lower court tests which obliged a Charter plaintiff to affirmatively
prove that discrimination against her was either unfair, unreasonable,
unjustified, unwarranted, or otherwise improper. 73 Such an onus would have
placed on equality seekers the difficult burden ofjustifying why they should be
treated as equals, when the Charter itself makes such treatment a strong
constitutional imperative.74
When the Andrews/Turpin analogous grounds test is juxtaposed with the
Court's potent definition of equality, section 15 becomes an unprecedented
promise of equality to the disadvantaged in Canada. Section 15 is extricated
from the bog of rationality review cases which pervaded in the lower courts
and in the United States. It avoids the prospect that the section 1 test would
have to be seriously diluted, to the detriment of women and minorities, in
order to save for government a reasonable latitude for legitimate legislation
and governance. Andrews/Turpin also dismissed a U.S. style "levels of
scrutiny" view of equality rights, which would have led some to enjoy more
equality than others, and which would have placed courts in the unacceptable
position of judging for themselves whose claims to equality among those
recognized in section 15 are more important. 75 It thus frees Canada from a
jurisprudential quicksand in which the United States is now struggling to
cope. 76
It would again have been reasonable to expect lower courts to respond
quickly to the Supreme Court's clear and strong directions on section 15.
This was not to be the case for a time. Rather, some lower courts stiffly
resisted the implementation of Andrews/Turpin by either attempting to narrow
or distinguish it, or by mouthing its words without effectively applying it. 77
This reticence again appears as a throwback to the pre-Andrews approach of
ineffectual protection for equality which predominated in many lower courts.
This initial response eventually gave way to a broader judicial acceptance of
Andrews/Turpin,78 and a commensurate disappearance of much of the section
15 litigation over business and economic regulation and criminal procedure
laws which do not disadvantage women or the other groups mentioned in
section 15, or those similarly disenfranchised.
73. Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 178-80; for comparison, see R. v Ertel, 35 CC (3d) 398; Wilson v
British Columbia Medical Services Commission, 30 BCLR (2d) I (BCSC 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 53
DLR (4th) 171 (BCA 1988).
74. See Lepofsky & Hart, 67 Canadian Bar Rev at 122 (cited in note 56).
75. See especially Andrews, [ 1989] 1 SCR at 177-78 (McIntyre).
76. Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432 (1985).
77. See, for example, R. v Paul .lagder Furs Ltd., 69 OR (2d) 172 (CA 1989) (Morden); Rheaume v
Ontario (Attorney General), 63 DLR (4th) 241 (Ont HC 1989).
78. See, for example, Wirhadizadeh v Ontario, 69 OR (2d) 422 (CA 1989).
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V
1990-THE SUPREME COURT'S UNEXPECTED PLUNGE DOWNWARD
At the close of the 1980s, legislative and constitutional initiatives
promoting equality rights together with their forceful judicial application by
the Supreme Court of Canada (with some more reluctant lower courts at
times lagging behind) combined to signal that the journey towards equality
and away from discrimination was on a path strongly dedicated to the serious
pursuit of these lofty goals. However, 1990 brought with it an abrupt and
drastic change ofjudicial direction in the constitutional equality arena, at least
at the Supreme Court level. This occurred in three important equality cases
which indicate a sudden and marked retreat from the court's commitment to
equality, and a fourth judgment released at the end of the year which
provided a surprising twist in the equality roller coaster. These decisions are
especially troubling, as it was the Supreme Court in the 1980s which was in
the forefront of the effort to lead Canada's judiciary out of its historical
quagmire in the equality field. Absent the court's continued leadership, the
future in the constitutional sphere for Canada's equality seekers seems quite
pessimistic.
A. Hess v. Regina
The first such reversal came in the court's finding in Hess v. Regina,79 that a
Criminal Code provision making it a crime for a male person over the age of
fourteen to have sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of fourteen, does
not even constitute prima facie sex discrimination contrary to Charter section
15, and that as such, it requires no justification under section 1. Speaking for
a slim majority of 4 to 3, Justice Wilson dismissed the section 15 sex equality
claim, even though the impugned law defined the offence in a fashion so that
only a male could commit it and only a female could be a victim of it, and
despite the further fact that these gender delineations are spelled out
explicitly in the provision. The Court held that there was no section 15
contravention because, as a matter of biological fact, only men could commit
the act of sexual intercourse against female victims.80 Thus, according to
Justice Wilson, the accused's sex was related to the law's purpose, and, in this
regard, a female's sex could not possibly relate to the evil at which the law was
aimed.81
Justice Wilson's section 15 analysis is an obvious application of the old
"similarly situated/similarly treated" approach to equality which the Supreme
Court, speaking at times through Justice Wilson herself, previously had
rejected as entirely unsuited to the task of securing equality.8 2 What Justice
Wilson held in effect in Hess is as follows: Parliament's purpose is to protect
79. [1990] 2 SCR 906.
80. Id at 929-30 (Wilson).
81. Id at 929.
82. Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 151-52 (Wilson).
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females under the age of fourteen from unwanted sex leading to pregnancy.
From the perspective of this goal, men and women, as accused persons or as
victims, are not similarly situated to each other. This is a matter of fact, and
more particularly, a matter of "biological fact." Put another way, the accused
did not establish that his sex is not reasonably related to the law's purpose.8 3
While Justice Wilson did not explicitly use the words "similarly situated," her
discussion precisely parallels the "similarly situated" analysis of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in a series of pre-Andrews/Turpin cases.8 4
Hess exposes some of the similarly situated test's inherent weaknesses.
The test is a vacuous concept which does not dictate any specific result in any
individual case.8 5 The Court could have held as readily that the impugned
law's purpose is to protect children from sexual corruption by adults. In that
event, men and women would have been treated unequally, and there would
be no matter of biological difference between men and women as accuseds or
victims which would relate to this legislative aim. In that event, the law would
have violated section 15 and would have required a section 1 justification.8 6
Justice Wilson's approach implicitly places on Charter plaintiffs an onus
under section 15 to show that they are not differently situated as a matter of
fact from those who are not harmed by the impugned law, at least where the
impugned legislative distinction pertains to a ground enumerated in section
15 or is analogous thereto. To disabled persons seeking equality under
section 15, this would entail an unfair constitutional presumption of their
difference from able-bodied persons. This directly contradicts Parliament's
reasons for including disability in section 15 in the first place.8 7
The Hess decision should be treated as being of dubious jurisprudential
value. On the section 15 point, the Court was badly split. Of the justices
participating in the decision, those now remaining on the Court would be
evenly divided on the point, since Justice Wilson's section 15 ruling was the
subject of a strong dissent. As well, the majority's section 15 comments were
entirely obiter dicta. The Court had invalidated the impugned law on other
grounds, and need not have addressed the section 15 challenge at all to
dispose of the appeal.88 Moreover, subsequent to Hess, the Supreme Court
reiterated its firm rejection of the similarly situated test under section 15,
albeit without any reference to Hess. 89
83. Hess v R., [1990] 2 SCR 906, 929.
84. See cases cited in note 55.
85. See id.
86. This is not to suggest that the impugned law was unsalvageable under § 1, but merely that
the majority's "similarly situated" analysis precluded the need for § I analysis.
87. See note 56 and accompanying text; see also M. David Lepofsky & Jerome E. Bickenbach,
Equality Rights and the Physically Handicapped, in Anne F. Bayefsky & Mary Eberts, eds, Equality Rights
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 346-47, 353 (Carswell, 1985); M. David Lepofsky,
Equality Rights for Handicapped Persons in the Charter, in Frank E. McArdle, ed, The Cambridge Lectures
(Yvon Blais, 1987).
88. Hess, [1990] 2 SCR at 90.
89. See 11cKinne, v Board of Governors of the Uniersitv of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229.
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B. The Mandatory Retirement Cases
Perhaps the most catastrophic downward plunge on the Canadian equality
roller coaster ride of equality came in December 1990 with the Canadian
Supreme Court's decisions in four proceedings attacking the mandatory
retirement of employees at age sixty-five. 90 While the Supreme Court's
treatment of equality under human rights statutes and the Charter in the
1980s boded well for the expansive enforcement of Charter equality rights for
disadvantaged minorities, the mandatory retirement decisions intimate a
massive reversal of direction in the constitutional context. Under them, the
Charter's equality guarantee in section 15 may prima facie be meaty and
meaningful. However, Charter section 1 ensures that the constitutional
umbrella is taken away from victims of discrimination as soon as the rain starts
to fall. This occurs through a serious dilution of the burden of justification
placed on governments under section 1 when it is shown that section 15
equality rights are infringed.
Under attack in these cases were the mandatory retirement policies of
universities, 9' government-run community colleges, 92 and a hospital. 93 As
well, two provincial human rights codes were challenged as themselves
discriminating on account of age, because their legislative bans on age-based
employment discrimination did not apply to persons aged sixty-five or
older.94 One's recourse to the legal enforcement machinery of human rights
commissions for age-based discrimination in employment was denied to
persons sixty-five or older, purely on account of their age.
The Supreme Court split on whether Charter section 15 applies to private
universities and hospitals, but unanimously agreed that it applies to
government-run community colleges and to the age definition in human
rights legislation. 95 The Court unanimously held that where the Charter
applies, the age distinctions vis-A-vis continued employment and access to
human rights commissions contravene section 15's equality rights
guarantee. 96 The Court's section 1 analysis, mainly expressed for the Court
by Justice La Forest, includes several serious flaws. Those reviewed here
pertain principally to the Court's method of applying section 1, and not to the
merits of the question whether mandatory retirement could, under some
circumstances, be constitutionally justified.
90. Id; Harrison v University of British Columbia, [1990] 3 SCR 451; Stoffman v Vancouver General
Hospital, [1990] 3 SCR 483; Douglas/Kwantlan Faculty Ass'n v Douglas College, [1990] 3 SCR 570.
91. Harrison, [1990] 3 SCR at 451.
92. Douglas/Kwantlan, [1990] 3 SCR at 570.
93. Stoffman, [1990] 3 SCR at 483.
94. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 229 (challenging § 9(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code);
Harrison, [1990] 3 SCR at 451 (challenging § I of the British Columbia Human Rights Act).
95. McKinney, [19901 3 SCR at 275-76 (La Forest, writing for himself, Dickson, and Gonthier);
concurring on this point are justices Sopinka, id at 445, and L'Heureux-Dube, id at 419; see also id at
320 (Wilson dissenting on this point); id at 446 (Cory concurring with Wilson).
96. Id at 279.
[Vol. 55: No. I
Page 167: Winter 1992]
1. The First Flaw. The mandatory retirement decisions' first flaw is the
Court's improper grant of substantial deference under section 1 to legislative
decisions in formulating and implementing human rights codes. The Court
concluded that because a human rights statute's purpose is to advance the
cause of equality between private parties in society, an aim tied to the
Charter's own purposes, the Court should not intervene to compel the
legislature to move towards this goal more quickly than it had planned.97
This judicial deference turns section 1 on its head, and disregards the core
purposes for guaranteeing equality in a democracy.
Under section 1, a government must shoulder a heavier burden when a
Charter infringement is more severe.98 Severity can be measured in part by
the extent to which a Charter right's infringement cuts to the quick of the
purposes for which the affected constitutional right is entrenched in the
Charter. In the equality context, the government's burden should increase,
inter alia, where impugned legislative discrimination bears upon the exercise
of fundamental rights. 99
Accordingly, the age definitions of the Ontario and B.C. human rights
statutes demand especially compelling justification rather than judicial
deference. The Supreme Court has characterized human rights statutes as
fundamental, virtually quasi-constitutional legislation.100 What better proof
could be provided of the pivotal nature of aged-based human rights
protection than the fact that freedom from discrimination because of age also
warrants entrenchment as a fundamental right in the Canadian Constitution.
A legislative decision to deny a class of persons the protection of such
fundamental legislation, simply because of their age, therefore bears directly
on the exercise of a quintessentially fundamental entitlement in Canadian
society, the freedom from discrimination, and cuts to the core of section 15's
purposes.
The right at stake, at least in the context of the challenges to age
limitations in human rights statutes, is not the right to employment or to ajob
as such. It is the right to the protection of human rights legislation-the right
to legal protection for the freedom from age-based discrimination. It is the
right to one's access to an important administrative agency, and ultimately to
the courts, to assert that one has been victimized by employment
discrimination. It is the right to one's day in court on a vital issue. When so
critical an entitlement is denied to a person on the explicit grounds of his or
her age, and regardless of his or her individual capacity to profit from the
97. Id at 317-18.
98. Reference re Criminal Code (Man), [1990] 1 SCR at 1190 (prostitution reference).
99. This approach is reflected in U.S. equal protection doctrine. Under the equal protection
clause of the 14th amendment, a discriminatory law is subjected to more exacting scrutiny when it
bears upon the exercise of fundamental rights than when it does not. See, for example, Skinner v
Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942). Although there is much about American equal protection doctrine
that is entirely unsuited to the Canadian constitutional context, this specific feature of U.S. equal
protection doctrine makes eminent sense and should be infused into § 15 analysis.
100. Simpsons-Sears, Ltd., [1985] 2 SCR at 541; Bhinder, [1985] 2 SCR at 586.
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responsible exercise of that right, section 1 demands the most compelling
justification to ensure that the discriminatory denial of this right is absolutely
required to serve critical societal goals. It is not to be shrugged off as lacking
sufficient gravity.
To support the Court's grant of judicial deference, Justice La Forest
advanced four arguments, none of which is persuasive. First, the Court
adverted to the fact that section 9(a) of the Code governs relations between
private parties-relations which are themselves not governed by the Charter
in general or by its equality guarantee in particular.' 0 ' Yet virtually all
legislation regulates relations between private parties. This is no ground for
deference, lest the Court automatically defer to virtually every instance of
legislative discrimination banned by section 15. Moreover, human rights
statutes do not simply regulate discrimination by private actors. They also
prohibit discrimination by government agencies.10 2
The Court's second reason for deference is tied to its first. Applying a
principle enunciated in a free expression case, the Court held that deference
to the legislature is warranted under section 1 where, in enacting an
impugned law, it attempts to balance the competing interests of different
private groups in society.' 0 3 In contrast, where the government is in the role
of a direct antagonist to constitutional rights, the Court held that such
deference is not deserved.1 4 Mr. Justice La Forest held that the impugned
mandatory retirement policies and enactments involve the government acting
as balancer of competing private interests, and that the government's policies
therefore merited deference. 0 5
There may be occasions when certain Charter infringements should
properly be harder to justify on account of the government's role as direct
antagonist to a claimant's rights. However, this should have no role to play in
a section 15 case. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged in both the
statutory human rights and Charter section 15 contexts, a purposive approach
to equality requires the Court's focus to be on the effects of impugned actions
on a claimant, and not on the intent underlying them.' 0 6 An effects-focused
approach to constitutional equality rights would not dismiss as less serious
cases in which the government purports to discriminate in the interest of
some other private group, short of a bonafide affirmative action program saved
by Charter section 15(2), since it is the effect of government conduct, and not
its intent, which should make the constitutional difference.
101. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 312-15.
102. See, for example, Ontario Human Rights Code 1981, SO 1981, ch 53, § 46 and Canadian
Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, ch H-6, § 66.
103. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 280-81, 285-86, applying Irwin Toy v Quebec (Attorney General),
[1989] 1 SCR 927, 944.
104. Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 SCR at 994.
105. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 287.
106. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR at 547; CentralAlberta Dairy Pool, [1990] 2 SCR at 505; Andrews,
[1989] 1 SCR at 173.
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Moreover, if judicial deference applied every time a section 15
contravention arises where government is balancing the interests of different
groups in society, such deference would be triggered in virtually all section 15
cases that proceed to the section 1 stage. Legislative and governmental
discrimination, on grounds set out in section 15 or on analogous grounds,
frequently involves the advancement of some at the expense of others. The
segregation of black schoolchildren or of children with disabilities in separate
and inferior schools would automatically merit judicial deference if the
government consciously does so to maximize the resources available for white
or able-bodied children. Such an outcome would flatly contradict section 15's
core values and would fail to reflect a "commitment to the unremitting
protection" of the Charter's guarantees.10 7
Mr. Justice La Forest's invocation of judicial deference because of the
legislature's role as balancer of competing interests is also highly
questionable, in light of previous Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
deference notion. Justice La Forest had previously questioned whether
judicial deference to legislatures is appropriate in the equality context. 08 As
well, the idea ofjudicial deference in section 1 analysis was, in effect, initially
conceived to advance equality rights values, since it was to apply where the
government attempts to protect vulnerable groups. 0 9 In the mandatory
retirement context, the government does not seek to protect a vulnerable
group. 1 0 Rather, it victimizes the elderly and invokes deference in its own
defense to an equality claim. Accordingly, the Court's invocation of judicial
deference contradicts both the letter and the spirit of its own deference
doctrine.
Next, in support of his grant of judicial deference, justice La Forest relied
on the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma," ' I
which the Supreme Court of Canada had previously invoked under Charter
section 1 in a freedom of religion case.' 12 Lee Optical holds that government
should be permitted to undertake legislative reform one step at a time,
addressing itself to the aspect of a social problem which is legislatively
deemed most pressing, without being second-guessed by the judiciary.,"3
Based on Lee Optical's judicial deference doctrine, Justice La Forest was
prepared to defer to legislative judgments as to who should receive the
benefits of legislative reform in the human rights context.
This is a serious misapplication of Lee Optical, wrenched out of its
American jurisprudential context. Lee Optical rejected due process and equal
protection challenges to state legislation granting a monopoly to opticians to
107. See Charter § 15.
108. R. v Edwards Books, [1986] 2 SCR 713, 795 (La Forest concurring).
109. Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 SCR at 101.
110. Justice Wilson properly makes this important point in her dissent in McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR
at 402-03.
111. 348 US 483, 489 (1955).
112. Edwards Books, [198612 SCR at 772.
113. Lee Optical, 348 US at 488.
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fit spectacles.' 1 4 It enunciated a strong principle of judicial deference to
legislative decisions, but in the specific context of laws which distinguish
between groups on grounds that are not inherently suspect and do not bear
upon the exercise of fundamental rights. Under U.S. equal protection
doctrine, such judicial deference clearly does not apply where a law either
draws distinctions based upon suspect grounds" 15 or impedes the exercise of
fundamental rights. Moreover, Lee Optical marks the U.S. Supreme Court's
final, decisive retreat from the 1904 to 1937 regime of activist substantive due
process, under which American courts had aggressively reviewed and often
overturned substantive social-economic regulations on account of their
interference with property and the freedom of contract." 6 Lee Optical
commanded strong judicial deference for such legislation, especially when
challenged on substantive due process grounds.
If the Lee Optical approach to constitutional rights were properly applied
under Charter section 15 in the Canadian context, the impugned mandatory
retirement provisions and policies would merit strict judicial scrutiny, and not
judicial deference. The mandatory retirement challenges involve both of the
features which trigger the most exacting scrutiny. The age restrictions in the
impugned human rights codes bear upon the exercise of a fundamental right,
the access to human rights protection from age-based employment
discrimination, and they discriminate based on age-a ground specifically
enumerated in section 15. 1 17 Moreover, these cases involved no substantive
due process challenge based on assertions of property or contractual
freedoms.
If Canadian courts give so sweeping an application to Lee Optical under
section 1, Charter section 15 will quickly become a hollow shell. This is
especially so in relation to section 15's guarantee of "equal benefit of the law
without discrimination." Governmental benefits are always extended in a
gradual, incrementalist fashion. If this simple fact merited judicial deference,
even when the legislature's incremental extension involves clear
discrimination on a ground which section 15 prohibits, then the Supreme
114. Id at 487.
115. Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 16-7, 16-14, at 1465-74 (Foundation Press,
2d ed 1988).
116. The paradigmatic case of the era is Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905). The United States
Supreme Court struck down a statute limiting the number of hours bakers could work as not within
the reasonable exercise of the state's police power. The case exemplifies the Court's former
willingness to invalidate economic regulations pursuant to the 14th amendment's guarantee of due
process.
117. This is not to argue for a "levels of scrutiny" approach to the grounds of discrimination
enumerated in § 15. This is simply to suggest that Lee Optical, if grafted onto Canadian law, would
bring with it a continuum of scrutiny analysis. Even under such a system, however, it would be
improper for age to receive only the lowest level of scrutiny. The grounds specifically enumerated in
§ 15 merit the most exacting scrutiny in light of the Charter's deliberate recognition of their
importance to the pursuit of equality.
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Court will have gone a long way toward finding that section 15 has little
practical force when government extends benefits to the public." 18
Finally, Justice La Forest seems to suggest that deference is warranted in
the human rights context since the purpose of the human rights code is the
promotion of the ideal of equality-an ideal which takes time to achieve.' 19 It
is true that the purpose of the code is the attainment of equality and that
securing this absolute ideal will indeed take time. However, it could not
plausibly be suggested that the purpose for denying the code's entitlement of
freedom from age-based employment discrimination to persons aged sixty-
five and older is the attainment of equality. There is no rational connection
between this wholesale disentitlement of the elderly and the promotion of
equality.
By its judicial deference, the Court failed to take the contravention of
Charter equality rights as seriously as it should have. Absent this deference,
the impugned provisions might well have been found unconstitutional. If
such deference pervades future section 15 cases when they reach the section 1
stage, governments will have an easy time justifying conduct which should be
viewed as constitutionally suspect.
2. The Second Flaw. As the mandatory retirement decisions' second flaw, the
court concluded that the purposes for the challenged mandatory retirement
policies, and for the age definitions in the impugned human rights statutes,
are sufficiently important to warrant the imposition of restrictions on elderly
persons' equality rights.' 20 The Court identified these restrictions' purposes
as (1) the provision of employment opportunities to young people, 12 1 (2) the
maintenance of flexibility in resource allocation and work force renewal, 1 22 (3)
the maintenance of settled workplace compensation schemes including
pensions on retirement,1 23 and (4) the protection of the dignity of
compulsorily retired employees, who are saved from demeaning performance
appraisals.' 2 4 Justice La Forest doubted that the clearing of job openings for
young persons was a sufficiently pressing goal to justify age discrimination, in
light of its inherently discriminatory tenor. 125 However, he found that the
other objectives were sufficiently compelling under section 1.126
118. To a significant degree, this could constitute a de facto retreat to the approach that the
Supreme Court had taken under the statutory Canadian Bill of Rights, under which the right to
equality was ineffectual with regard to government benefits. See Bliss v Canada (Attorney General),
[ 1979] 1 SCR 183. Such a retreat would directly conflict with the intention of the Charter's framers.
Section 15 was specifically amended during the constitutional debate leading to the Charter's
entrenchment to include the "equal benefit clause" in order to reverse the Bliss decision and to
ensure that the equality guarantee fully applies to government benefits.
119. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 318-19.
120. Id at 281.
121. Id at 300-03.
122. Idat281.
123. Id at 301-02.
124. Id at 282-83, 314.
125. Id at 302-03.
126. Id at 301-02.
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Once the Court found that a core reason for mandatory retirement and for
the elderly's exclusion from human rights age discrimination protection is to
provide job opportunities for young persons, the proper result would have
been to declare that this goal is per se discriminatory and, as such, is an
unconstitutional objective. It is intended to deny work to elderly persons, on
account of their age, for the very reason of giving jobs to the young. This is
not to suggest that every legislative age distinction ipso facto has an
unconstitutional goal that is outside section l's purview. Rather, it simply
means that where the legislature makes an adverse age distinction for the very
aim of taking away opportunities from one age group to give to another, it
engages an unconstitutionally discriminatory motive, except where defensible
under section 15(2) as a bona fide affirmative action program.
Longstanding human rights authority holds that an action is
discriminatory even if only one of its motivating reasons is impermissible,
such as sex, age, or race, although there may have been other non-
discriminatory reasons motivating the action. 127 Once an act is tainted by a
discriminatory purpose, it is no answer that there were other causes for the
act. Otherwise, one could effectively secure discriminatory aims by carefully
piggy-backing them on top of less questionable goals. In light of this critical
equality principle, the impugned mandatory retirement policies and
provisions should have been found to have impermissible purposes, and
hence to be unconstitutional, regardless of any additional objectives for these
measures posited by their defenders.
This result would comport with a theme in two early Charter cases where
section 1 was seen as unavailable to government where a law had as its
purpose an aim which is directly contrary or inimical to the Charter right in
question. In Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec Association of Protestant School
Boards et al.,128 the Court unanimously overturned a Quebec statute limiting
access to English education as contrary to Charter section 23's minority
language education rights guarantee. The Court held that section 1 could not
be invoked where the law's purpose was directly contrary to the section 23
entitlement. The Court did not engage in any assessment of the law's
reasonableness or demonstrable justification.
In Regina v. Big M Drug Mart,129 Justice Wilson, in a concurring opinion,
ruled that a law is unsalvageable under section 1 if its purpose is incompatible
with the Charter. There, the federal Lord's Day Act, forcing retail stores to
close on Sundays, was found to infringe the freedom of religion and to be
unsustainable under section 1 because its objective was the compulsion of
religious observance-a goal inimical to the Charter's core reason for
guaranteeing freedom of religion. It was not simply a matter of finding that
the law's purpose was insufficiently weighty to comport with section 1. The
law's purpose was itself tainted as being constitutionally intolerable. Because
127. Cameron v Nel-Gor Castle Nursing Home, 5 CHRR D/2170.
128. [1984] 2 SCR 66.
129. [1985] 1 SCR at 362.
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the law had an unconstitutional purpose, it was unnecessary to examine
whether its means to attain that goal were proportional to its objective.
Where a legislative goal is unconstitutional, it simply cannot be pursued
consonant with Charter section 1 regardless of the means employed.
The same flaw can be found with the impugned mandatory retirement
provisions and policies. The legislature's goal, youth employment at the
expense of the elderly, is an unconstitutional aim. This should have tainted
the entire section 1 defence and sent the legislature back to the drawing
board.
The Big M Drug Mart and Protestant School Boards decisions differ factually
from the mandatory retirement situation. These earlier cases did not involve
a law with multiple purposes, only one of which is unconstitutional. They
involved "single purpose" laws, where the single purpose was
unconstitutional. However, this distinction should make no difference lest a
legislature be able to piggy-back legislative purposes to enable it to do that
which the Constitution forbids.
3. The Third Flaw. The mandatory retirement decisions' third flaw was that
the Court failed to effectively apply the section 1 requirement that a law
infringing a Charter right must be shown to impair that right as little as
possible, consistent with the promotion of the impugned law's pressing and
substantial objectives. 130 Had this requirement been effectively applied the
human rights legislation before the Court and most, if not all, of the
mandatory retirement policies in issue would have failed to pass section 1
muster.
The minimal impairment branch of the section 1 test is critically important
to the Charter's practical success in protecting civil liberties and in
constraining improper government conduct. It provides that Charter rights
can be infringed only in specific situations where it is clearly necessary to do
so to promote vital government ends. Where it is not necessary to take away a
person's Charter rights, it cannot be demonstrably justified to do so in a free
and democratic society which has a fundamental constitutional commitment
to these rights.
Of the section 1 test's various components, the least impairment
requirement most effectively infuses the Charter into the daily operations of
government. In deciding on new initiatives, government agencies frequently
review and choose from among a range of options. The least impairment
requirement compels government actually to assess each option's impact on
Charter rights and to select that option which threatens those rights the least,
consonant with the attainment of critical policy goals. Such governmental
reflection is essential to head off Charter infringements before they ever
occur. The least impairment requirement directs governments to tread
extremely carefully and hesitantly when their actions potential bear upon
130. R. v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR at 139.
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constitutional rights. It ensures that the lofty rhetoric frequently advanced in
support of impugned legislation and government action is tempered by the
need to link the specifics in these laws directly and intimately to the actual
achievement of laudatory governmental goals.
In the mandatory retirement decisions, the Supreme Court held that the
minimal impairment requirement is met by an Ontario Human Rights Code
provision which takes away from all persons over the age of sixty-five any
recourse to the human rights commission for age-based employment
discrimination.1 3 1 Yet, even if one accepts the importance of mandatory
retirement policies at age sixty-five in workplaces which have the quid pro quo
of post-retirement pension schemes, and whose labour turnover is primarily
triggered through retirement, the flat denial of any legal protection of age-
based employment discrimination whatsoever in Ontario respecting any
employer whatsoever cannot meet the section 1 minimal impairment
requirement. As the dissenting opinions properly indicate, not every
employer who fires some or all of its employees at age sixty-five has given
either strong assurances ofjob security up to age sixty-five or a pension plan
for them on retirement.' 3 2 There may be no quid for many who are saddled
with the mandatory retirement quo. As well, not every employer who
terminates some or all employees at age sixty-five must do so to free up job
openings for younger persons. The majority first held that mandatory
retirement is justified in the peculiar, rarified context of university professors
who are tenured, and whose work requires the strong protection for academic
freedom. Then it projected this entirely unique situation onto the entire
workforce-a wholly untenable analogy. 133
The government's policy goals also do not justify the denial to persons
over sixty-five of any human rights protection whatsoever concerning age-
based employment discrimination. For example, a 50-year-old employee can
file an age-discrimination human rights complaint if his or her employer pays
him or her less per hour than a 30-year-old employee on grounds of their
different ages. A 66-year-old employee cannot make a similar claim if he or
she is paid less than an employee under sixty-five. This is so simply because
he or she is over sixty-five.
A legislature wishing to preserve bona fide mandatory retirement policies,
for the reasons recognized by the Court, could have allowed for age
discrimination claims by persons over age sixty-five in human rights
legislation. A narrowly crafted exemption could have been enacted, allowing
for age distinctions which are bona fide and reasonable occupational
requirements, including the maintenance of a bona fide 65-year mandatory
retirement policy, in the case of employers whose employees have strong job
security guarantees and post-retirement pension plans. Such a provision
would have impaired Charter equality rights far less than the provisions
131. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 315.
132. Id at 405-06 (Wilson dissenting); id at 434 (l'Heureux-Dub6 concurring).
133. Id at 305-06.
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impugned in these decisions. It could be easily formulated by a legislature
and readily implemented by human rights commissions and boards. It would
have achieved the legislative goals of maintaining bona fide mandatory
retirement programs at age sixty-five without sacrificing the Charter rights of
employees further than was needed. 34
Moreover, the Supreme Court could have readily so found without
stepping outside its judicial role. Such a broad-brush principle could have
been enunciated without drawing the Court into the minutiae of legislative
fine line-drawing. The Court has been willing to express such an opinion
when it has found legislation invalid in previous cases. 13 5
4. The Fourth Flaw. The mandatory retirement decisions' fourth and
perhaps most vexing flaw is that they are rooted in an unfair stereotyping of
the elderly. As one factor weighed in the section 1 balance, Justice La Forest
noted that age can correlate with ability since with the advancing of age comes
a loss of capacity.13 6 The Court attempted to soften this point by
acknowledging that this impact of aging will vary from individual to
individual.' 37 Nevertheless, the Court clearly infused this age/ability factor
into its reasoning. It viewed the loss of ability with age, explicitly or tacitly, as
rendering compulsory retirement at age sixty-five an effective means of
promoting a competent work force, and as making mandatory retirement
potentially less invidious as a form of discrimination.13 8
This kind of stereotyping lies at the heart of much of the discrimination
and inequality confronting the elderly, as well as women, disabled persons,
racial minorities, and other disadvantaged groups in society. The eradication
of such stereotyping, and of exclusionary practices motivated by it, is a core
objective of both human rights legislation and section 15 of the Charter. The
best remedy for stereotypical generalizations is a potent legal requirement
that individuals be assessed on their individual merits and not on categorical
judgments tied to personal characteristics.
As the Court's own judgment amply demonstrates, such stereotyping is a
core factor motivating mandatory retirement practices.' 3 9 For the Court itself
to articulate such stereotypes is enormously problematic. For it to advance
such stereotypes as a partial justification for a denial of equality with respect
134. This is not to suggest that mandatory retirement as such would be constitutionally justified
even if preserved by a more narrowly drafted Human Rights Code provision. That question is
beyond the scope of this article. The point to be made here is simply that even if mandatory
retirement can at times be constitutionally justified, the Court's "least impairment" analysis is still
fundamentally flawed.
135. See, for example, R. v Morgentaler, [ 1988] 1 SCR 30; Hunter v Southam Inc., [ 1984] 2 SCR 145.
136. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 289, 297-98 (La Forest).
137. Id at 289.
138. See, for example, id at 305-06.
139. See id at 289; see also Etobicoke, [1982] 1 SCR at 210 (invalidating a municipal fire
department's policy of compulsorily retiring fire fighters at age 60, as impermissible age-based
employment discrimination under the Ontario Human Rights Code). In Etobicoke, a unanimous
Court denounced as merely impressionistic and insufficient the fire department's testimony that fire
fighting is a "young man's game."
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to a fundamental right, such as access to human rights protection, constitutes
a dramatic step backward on the road to equality.
In an apparent attempt to reduce the force of his reference to an
age/ability correlation, Justice La Forest noted in passing that mandatory
retirement does not purport to be justified by an assertion that all persons
over sixty-five suddenly are incapable of continuing in productive
employment.1 40 Indeed, he had opined at length elsewhere about mandatory
retirement's justification as a quid pro quo for guarantees of job security and
pension entitlements.141 Yet this does not undo the force of his clear reliance
on stereotypes about the elderly as part of his section 1 analysis. After all, if
mandatory retirement was justifiable solely on the basis of the quid pro quo
rationale and the revitalization of the work force objective, it would have been
entirely unnecessary to refer to asserted correlations between age and ability
as part of the section 1 analysis.
Moreover, in the mandatory retirement opinion addressing challenges to
the compulsory termination of doctors' hospital privileges at age sixty-five at
Vancouver General Hospital, the Court squarely and centrally relied on the
age/ability stereotype under section 1. It found that mandatory retirement of
doctors at sixty-five, at least in so far as their hospital privileges are
concerned, is rationally connected to the hospital's asserted goal of ensuring
competence of staff and high quality medical services. 142 In this light, the
Court's effort to deny its reliance on such an age/ability stereotype becomes
puzzling.
Indeed, the Court's approach to the age/ability stereotype in this case is
most unfathomable. The Court ruled that in such settings mandatory
retirement is an appropriate and narrowly-tailored means to ensure the best
quality health care for patients. 43 Yet, on the facts apparently before the
Court, the hospital in question had undertaken an annual peer review of
doctors' abilities, regardless of the mandatory retirement scheme. 144 Unless it
were established that such ongoing peer review was incapable of rooting out
doctors whose skills had degenerated to an unacceptable level, it is hard to see
what mandatory retirement at sixty-five could add. If anything, it would only
force out of work those doctors who had, on peer review, already been found
to be competent to continue in practice-a consequence which cannot be tied
rationally to the goal of protecting patients' health.
140. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 297 (La Forest).
141. Id at 303-04, 307, 310-11, 313-14.
142. Stoffman v Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 SCR at 524-26 (La Forest).
143. See, for example, id at 528-29.
144. The various opinions on this point are confusing. Justice L'Heureux-Dube states that the
hospital now undertakes these annual reviews. Id at 563-65. Justice Wilson states that the hospital
previously undertook these annual reviews until 1980, when, for administrative convenience reasons,
it replaced this process with the impugned mandatory retirement scheme. Id at 554. Justice La
Forest, for the Court, makes no mention of this at all. What is apparent in any event is that the
hospital either now has, or recently has had, an annual review for doctors. If it has none any longer,
one would question the hospital's commitment to the protection of patients' health through the
ongoing maintenance of a sufficiently competent medical staff.
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Additionally, in McKinney, the Court emphasized that mandatory
retirement serves in part to protect the dignity of aging employees by helping
them to avoid the embarrassment of performance reviews and by instead
allowing them to continue their employment up to age sixty-five even if they
are not performing up to snuff.' 45 Such a rationale, wedded to the age/ability
correlation, cannot rationally apply in the Vancouver General situation for two
obvious reasons. First, the hospital has required annual performance reviews.
Mandatory retirement therefore does not remove from doctors the asserted
indignity of such reviews. Second, if the Court's primary concern in Vancouver
General was with the paramount goal of safeguarding patients' health as it
claimed, it would make no sense to endorse a mandatory retirement scheme
on a rationale that it enables doctors to continue working up to age sixty-five
even if their talent is declining. A heart surgeon presumably should not be
left in the operating room at age sixty-four for another year, while his or her
surgical skills are deteriorating, as a quid pro quo for mandatory retirement at
age sixty-five, if health protection is so important a goal.
The Court's reliance on such stereotypes about the elderly is
fundamentally inconsistent with section 15's central purposes, as the Court
had previously identified them. In Andrews and Turpin, the Court held that
section 15 aims to protect persons from disadvantageous treatment on
account of stereotypes and broad-brush generalizations based on such
personal attributes as sex, religion, disability, or age. 146 Section 1 cannot be
properly invoked to justify the state's imposition of disadvantageous
treatment on the basis of the stereotypes which section 15 aims to eradicate
from the government's conduct. Otherwise, section 1 will become the source
for the Charter's perpetuation of a central cause for governmental
discrimination rather than becoming a key component in the eradication of its
root causes.
5. The Fifth Flaw. The fifth flaw in the Court's analysis was the implicit view
that the age discrimination inherent in mandatory retirement is not motivated
by prejudice. From the overall tenor of the opinion of the court, this
assumption can be seen as diminishing the severity of age discrimination. It
accordingly would diminish the justificatory burden on the government and
other bodies defending these practices. To the extent that such a
consideration actually influences the Court, it can be seen as an outdated
approach to equality rights which bodes ill for many equality seekers, such as
disabled persons and women. As the Supreme Court had recognized in its
equality rulings in the 1980s, any meaningful enforcement of human rights
requires a court's attention to be fixed squarely on the effect of impugned
action on the victim of the discrimination, and not upon the intent of the
discriminator.
145. AlcKinnev, [1990] 3 SCR at 286-87 (La Forest).
146. Andrews, [1989] I SCR at 174-75; Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR at 1331.
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To the extent that the Court viewed discrimination as more tolerable if it is
well-meaning, and not motivated by prejudicial animus, it would implicitly
treat sex-based and disability-based discrimination as somehow more
tolerable, or less discordant, under the Charter. This is because the vast
preponderance of discriminatory practices against women and disabled
persons are not motivated by hatred against those disadvantaged groups.
Rather, they are frequently motivated by well-intentioned paternalism or
simple outdated stereotypes. Such stereotyping, albeit unmotivated by
prejudice or animus, must be construed as an aggravating factor under
section 1 necessitating even greater justification if the government is to
excuse its discriminatory conduct. To take the Supreme Court's apparent
approach is effectively to condone constitutionally one of the greatest sources
of inequality.
6. The Sixth Flaw. The Court's final flaw was that it entirely confused the
concepts of direct discrimination and unintentional or adverse effects
discrimination, and erroneously called mandatory retirement "adverse
effects" discrimination. 147 According to longstanding Canadian equality
doctrine, direct discrimination occurs when a person or group is denied a
benefit or is subjected to a special burden explicitly because he or she has a
particular protected personal characteristic, such as age, sex, religion, or
disability. 148 In such cases, the discrimination is presumed to be purposive or
intentional simply because the government or other discriminating party
made the protected characteristic a reason for denying the benefit or
imposing the burden. For example, if a law states that no black person may
obtain a job in the provincial public service, it amounts to direct, intentional
discrimination, precisely because the law enumerates the racial classification
on its face. One need not prove any malice underlying this exclusionary,
overtly race-based classification to establish that it is intentionally
discriminatory. 4 9
In contrast, "adverse effects discrimination" (which is sometimes called
systemic discrimination, unintentional discrimination, or indirect
discrimination) occurs when a requirement universally imposed appears
neutral on its face, but has a disproportionate impact on a protected minority.
The classic example is an employer's work rule requiring that all employees
work Saturday shifts, apart from other weekday assignments. This rule does
not purport on its face to discriminate because of religion, and indeed applies
equally to all employees regardless of their religions. However, the rule has
the effect of precluding Seventh Day Adventists from working for that
employer because Adventists adhere to a core religious teaching that gainful
employment is prohibited on their Sabbath, which is observed from Friday
sunset to Saturday sunset. The Saturday work rule is said to have adverse and
147. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 279 (La Forest).
148. Tarnopolsky & Pentney, Discrimination and the Law at 4-19 through 4-22 (cited in note 9).
149. Cameron v Nel-Gor Castle Nursing Home, 5 CHRR D/2170.
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discriminatory effects on Adventists, and hence is prima facie discriminatory
because of religion. ' 50
Applying this two-category approach, the mandatory retirement regimes
in issue before the Supreme Court were obvious examples of direct,
intentional age-based discrimination. One's employment and one's access to
the protection of human rights legislation from age-based employment
discrimination are each denied for the explicit reason of one's age. Persons
over the age of sixty-five are deliberately singled out for worse treatment.
Yet, in McKinney, the Court did not hold that the age discrimination in the
impugned mandatory retirement policies and provisions amounted to
intentional or purposive discrimination. Instead, it held, without explanation,
that it only constituted adverse effects discrimination.Isi This
characterization is quite erroneous and is impossible to square with clear,
longstanding human rights and equality doctrine. The impugned mandatory
retirement policies and provisions are the most obvious examples of direct
discrimination and cannot possibly be characterized as adverse effects
discrimination. This fundamental misconception of equality rights is
especially troublesome since it could be explained (though not justified) only
by an implicit, though unarticulated view that discriminatory intent exists only
where deliberate age-based adverse treatment is motivated by overt malicious
animus. This view would be a radical retrenchment from the progress that
has slowly been achieved in human rights and equality rights jurisprudence.
In summary, the mandatory retirement judgments constitute a substantial
downward plunge on the roller coaster ride of equality rights in Canada, both
because of the Court's validation of the wholesale relegation of elderly
persons to second-class, impoverished status in the employment context, and
because of the Court's depletion of important section 1 principles which had
promised to serve equality so well. The Court, at least in the constitutional
context, has strongly implied that it is.reverting to the ineffectual approach to
equality which predominated in the Canadian judiciary throughout the bulk of
this century. This result flows from the subtle intricacies of the section 1 test
rather than through a wholesale and open repudiation of equality as a norm
meriting serious judicial attention.
C. Regina v. Sheldon S.
Along with Hess and the mandatory retirement decisions, the Supreme
Court's third 1990 equality decision could substantially curtail section 15's
reach, even before resorting to section 1 becomes necessary. In Regina v.
Sheldon S.,152 the Court rejected an accused youth's section 15 challenge to
section 4 of the Young Offenders Act,' 53 a provision which granted each
150. See Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR at 558; CentralAlberta Dair,y Pool, [ 1990] 2 SCR 489; see also
Ont Human Rts Code § 10 (1981).
151. McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 279 (La Forest).
152. R. v Sheldon S., [1990] 2 SCR 254.
153. Young Offenders Act, SC 1980-81-82-83, ch 110 § 4.
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provincial Attorney General the discretion to establish alternative measures
programs for children and youth charged with criminal offenses. Only
Ontario had declined to establish an alternative measures program under this
provision. The accused claimed that Ontario's failure to exercise this
discretion discriminated against young persons in Ontario as compared to
those in other provinces.
That the Court unanimously rejected this section 15 argument is itself
above reproach since differential treatment based on province of residence
(or in this case, province of alleged offence and of prosecution) is not a
personal characteristic analogous to the grounds enumerated in section 15.
Indeed, in dicta, the Court properly noted this fatal flaw with the section 15
claim. However, it chose to dispose of the constitutional challenge on far
broader and highly problematic grounds.
The Court held that section 15 cannot be invoked to attack an Attorney
General's action or inaction under the impugned provision since section 15
protects against only discrimination in law. Here, the law was not the source
of the discrimination since the provision in question did not compel Ontario's
Attorney General to refuse to implement an alternative measures program for
young offenders. By this, the Court clearly implies, if it does not overtly
proclaim, that section 15 is available to attack discrimination only where a law
itself requires the imposition of the specific action which constitutes
inequality. Section 15 cannot therefore ever be engaged where the inequality
arises from a public official's exercise of discretion, even when that discretion
is clearly conferred on the public official by a law.
Yet, section 15's very wording commands a very different approach to the
Charter's ban on governmental discrimination. It goes out of its way to
guarantee equality "before"'and "under" the law, as well as equality in the
"protection" and "benefit" of the law.' 54 This wording is designed to ensure
that section 15 targets both discrimination in the substance or content of the
law, as well as inequalities in the law's actual administration by public officials.
How a public official exercises his or her statutory discretion is a core
component of the way in which a law is practically administered, or, in section
15's terms, in how one is treated "before" and "under" the law. The word
"law" in section 15 is not dispositive of the question before the Supreme
Court in Sheldon S. Rather, the words "before," "under," "protection of,"
and "benefit of," juxtaposed with the word "law,"'155 are critical, and were
evidently overlooked by the Supreme Court.
Sheldon S., if not reversed or construed very narrowly, would have the
practical effect of immunizing from Charter scrutiny the vast preponderance
of government action. This is because the bulk of government action is not
specifically compelled by a mandatory directive in a law. Rather, it is taken
under permissive, discretion-conferring legislative provisions, akin to those
154. See note 40.
155. See id.
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found in the law under consideration in Sheldon S. For example, if a minister
has open-ended statutory discretion to hire his or her staff, and is not
compelled by statute to hire any particular individual, a ministerial decision to
reject a black person's application on account of his or her race is untouchable
under Charter section 15. Ironically, even the discredited equality rights
guarantee in the statutory Canadian Bill of Rights might be more able to
reach such conduct than is Charter, at least if it occurs in the federal public
service, since virtually the only discrimination which that guarantee addresses
is inequality in the administration of the law, and not in the law's substantive
content. Section 15 was intended to incorporate both the limited protection
included in the Canadian Bill of Rights and much more. Yet after Sheldon S., it
is questionable whether it can achieve this goal.
The mandatory retirement, Sheldon S., and Hess decisions together suggest
that equality rights protection under the Charter faced serious new peril in
1990. However, the year ended with an ironic glimmer of hope for legal
protection from discrimination when the equality rights roller coaster took a
peculiar turn. At year's end, the Supreme Court released a series of decisions
rejecting freedom of expression challenges to hate propaganda laws under
the Charter. 56 The Court held that the dissemination of messages which
promote hatred against identifiable racial or religious groups infringe the
freedom of expression as guaranteed by Charter section 2(b). However, these
legal restrictions on hate-mongering were upheld under section 1. In issue
were Criminal Code provisions banning hate propaganda against racial or
religious minorities 57 and a Canadian Human Rights Act provision
prohibiting the repeated use of the telephone to disseminate messages likely
to promote hatred against such groups.158 The Court held that the aim of
these laws-the promotion of equality and full participation in society for
racial, religious, and other minorities-is so central a tenet of a free and
democratic society that its furtherance can warrant the imposition of civil and
even criminal law restrictions on free speech. This was so due to the
discrimination which hate-mongering can cause and the psychological trauma
which minorities can suffer when targeted by such expression.
A marked departure from the American constitutional treatment of
freedom of expression, 159 the hate propaganda cases strongly suggest that the
Court retains a powerful commitment to the goal of equality rights protection.
Yet these decisions appear profoundly ironic in light of the mandatory
retirement rulings. Taken together, these cases suggest that the Supreme
156. R. v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697 (upholding a high school teacher's hate propaganda
conviction for teaching his class virulent anti-Semitic theories of history); R. v Andrews, [1990] 3 SCR
870 (upholding a criminal conviction for breach of the hate propaganda provisions of the Criminal
Code); Canada Human Rights Commission v Taylor, [1990] 3 SCR 892 (upholding contempt conviction
for breach of an order, pursuant to the Canadian Human Rights Act, banning certain anti-Semitic
and racist messages on a White Supremacist Party's telephone answering machine).
157. See Crim Code, RSC 1985, ch C-46 § 319.
158. Can Hum Rights Act RSC 1985, ch H-6 § 13.
159. See, for example, Village of Skokie v National Socialist Party of America, 51 111 App 3d 279, 366
NE2d 347 (1977); Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852 (ED Mich 1989).
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Court views equality to be so important an aim that it will sacrifice free speech
to advance this goal, even though it has repeatedly recognized that free
speech is itself fundamental to a democracy. 60 Yet, when called upon directly
to enforce equality rights in the mandatory retirement cases, the Court quickly
deferred to legislatures and gave judicial sanction for the stereotyping of a
disadvantaged minority. It appears that, as of 1990, the Court will invoke
equality as a reason to defend legislation and restrict constitutional free
speech, but it is far less willing to invoke equality to overturn legislation and
to enforce constitutional anti-discrimination guarantees.
If one views 1990's landmark human rights case, Christie v. Alberta Dairy
Pool,161 together with the hate propaganda cases and in contrast to Sheldon S.,
Hess, and the mandatory retirement decisions, one finds an apparently
confused and ambivalent, if not entirely contradictory, judicial attitude toward
the value of equality. In Christie, the Court unanimously reversed its five-year-
old human rights code decision which effectively had held that only some of
Canada's human rights statutes impose a duty on employers, landlords, and
service providers to accommodate the needs of women, disabled persons, and
other disadvantaged minorities, where such accommodation is needed to
ensure equality of opportunity.16 2 Christie's statutory interpretation ruling
reflected a continued dedication to equality protection, at least through the
interpretation of human rights statutes. It also reflected profound judicial
courage and candor, in that the Court, by explicitly overturning its previous
authority, overtly recognized that its previous decision was simply erroneous
and indefensible.
VI
CONCLUSION-THE ROAD AHEAD
At this important crossroad on the path to full equality rights protection,
there are two possible routes which the Supreme Court can choose to follow.
By the first route, it can explicitly or implicitly move away from Hess and the
mandatory retirement decisions' approach to equality rights. This the Court
could do effectively since the most problematic findings in those decisions
were supported only by a minority of the justices who now remain on the
Court. Hess and the mandatory retirement rulings could be relegated to a
position of minimal precedential significance on account of their profound
departure from important equality principles. Similarly, Sheldon S.'s
restriction of section 15's ban on discrimination to inequalities compelled by a
law could be disapproved as effectively unnecessary to the case's resolution
since a simple application of the Andrews/Turpin approach to section 15 would
have disposed of the case most handily.
160. See, for example, Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 SCR at 969.
161. See Central Alberta Dairy Pool, [1990] 2 SCR 489.
162. See Bhinder, [1985] 2 SCR 561.
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By the second route, the Court could stick to the downward path charted
in the Sheldon S., Hess, and mandatory retirement decisions. In so doing, it
would leave Canada's racial minorities, women, disabled persons, and other
analogous equality-seeking disadvantaged groups with little practical
protection under the hitherto-promising Charter of Rights. If they are able to
persuade the Court to adhere to the Andrews/Turpin approach to the
interpretation of section 15, equality-seekers will meet with potentially
extreme judicial deference for legislation and government action under
section 1, replete with government's ability effectively to piggyback invidious
discriminatory motives on top of more laudable aims. Governmental
discrimination can be fortified by stereotyping and paternalism toward
disadvantaged groups, and the government's section 1 obligation to tailor its
laws and actions bearing on section 15 rights carefully so as to impair these
rights as little as possible will have dubious practical impact.
The preferable direction is for the Supreme Court to steer a clear ascent
back to the promising heights of Andrews and Turpin, and to leave Hess, Sheldon
S., and McKinney far behind. Section 1 of the Charter should not tolerate,
much less countenance, any stereotyping of the elderly, women, persons with
disabilities, or anyone else protected by section 15. Governmental
discrimination should be actionable under the Charter whether it is compelled
by a law or simply imposed by the action of a public official or governmental
agency. In section 15 cases which proceed to section 1, deference to
legislatures should be the very rare exception. The original Oakes formulation
of the section 1 test should be applied with full force in equality cases, much
as it has remained in force in at least some other constitutional contexts.
163
Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court's fast retreat from the "least
impairment" requirement should be reversed, since it is this aspect of the
section 1 test which ultimately makes legislatures and governments live up to
the Constitution's convictions and which tests their section 1 justifications for
their true validity. Such measures can help ensure that the Supreme Court's
vital infusion of equality as a core legal value in Canada in the 1980s can pack
a practical punch and can relegate to the history books Canada's unfortunate,
longstanding judicial history of discrimination that is unrecognized and
equality that is unprotected.
163. See, for example, R. v Xlorgentaler, 12 DLR (4th) 502 (Ont CA 1984); Hess v R., [ 1990] 2 SCR
906.
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